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Abstract
By successfully exploiting human vulnerabilities, fake websites have emerged as a major source of online fraud.
Fake websites continue to inflict exorbitant monetary losses and also have significant ramifications for online
security. We explore the process by which salient performance-related elements could increase the reliance
on protective tools and, thus, reduce the success rate of fake websites. We develop the theory of detection
tool impact (DTI) for this investigation by borrowing and contextualizing the protection motivation theory. Based
on the DTI theory, we conceptualize a model to investigate how salient performance and cost-related
elements of detection tools could influence users’ perceptions of the tools and threats, efficacy in dealing with
threats, and reliance on such tools. The research method was a controlled lab experiment with a novel and
extensive experimental design and protocol in two distinct domains: online pharmacies and banks. We found
that the detector accuracy and speed, reflecting in response efficacy as perceived by users, form the pivotal
coping mechanism in dealing with security threats and are major conduits for transforming salient performancerelated elements into increased reliance on the detector. Furthermore, reported reliance on the detector
showed a significant impact on the users’ performance in terms of self-protection. Therefore, users’ perceived
response efficacy should be used as a critical metric to evaluate the design, assess the performance, and
promote the use of fake-website detectors. We also found that cost of detector error had profound impacts on
threat perceptions. We discuss the significant theoretical and empirical implications of the findings.
Keywords: Protection Motivation Theory, Experimental Design, Spoofed Websites, Concocted Websites,
Detection Tool, Protective IT Artifact.
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1. Introduction
One of the most vulnerable points in the online security process is when users decide to visit and use
a website (Schneier, 2000). Semantic attacks focus on “targeting the people” instead of exploiting
hardware and software vulnerabilities as done by many other Internet security attacks, such as
viruses, denial of service, and malware (Schneier, 2000). In such attacks, users’ unpredictable
behaviors play a critical role (Cranor, 2008; Kumaraguru, Sheng, Aquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2010).
Fake websites take advantage of this weak point in the security loop by posing as legitimate providers
of information, goods, and services. As such, they rely on meaningful content to exploit weaknesses
in human recognition of such attacks (Schneier, 2000).
Fake websites generate billions of dollars in fraudulent revenue by exploiting such human
vulnerabilities (Zhang, Egelman, Cranor, & Hong, 2007) and are estimated to comprise nearly 20
percent of the Web (Gyongyi & Garcia-Molina, 2005). Fake websites offering harmful anti-virus
software have defrauded 43 million users (Willis, 2009). According to an FDA study, less than 10
percent of the 12,000 Internet pharmacies examined were legitimate (Krebs, 2005). Moreover, the
problem has worldwide reach; recently, a group of fraudsters in China developed fake military
hospital websites used to defraud over 10,000 people (An, 2010). A 2011 Gartner report notes that
phishing attacks using fake websites remain one of the biggest forms of Internet fraud for individuals
and organizations (Gartner, 2011). Even more damaging than the immediate monetary losses is the
potential for identity theft, where the personal information is used to open additional accounts
(McAfee, 2011b). Javelin Strategy (2014) has reported that more than 13 million people were the
victim of identity theft in 2013. In such situations, the direct monetary losses account for only 10
percent of the total fraud cost, with remediation and reputation costs (e.g., impact on credit
scores/ratings) encompassing the majority of the losses (Lennon, 2011).
Fake websites also have dire ramifications for Internet users’ health and wellness. According to
studies conducted by the World Health Organization and other organizations, numerous deaths have
been attributed to fake medical websites, while the number of people visiting such sites continues to
increase dramatically (Easton, 2007; Armin, 2010). Consequently, in addition to monetary losses,
fake websites have negative long-term trust and security-related implications at the global level
(Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal, 2004).
Countering fake-website attacks requires warning and educating users (Kumaraguru, 2009;
Kumaraguru et al., 2010). Fake-website detection tools are designed to warn users. Repeated use of
detection tools could also increase users’ confidence in their own abilities to spot and avoid attacks.
Therefore, the effectiveness of such tools is predicated on their use (Wu, Miller, & Garfunkel, 2006).
To this end, we use a user-centered approach to investigate the relations between critical tool
elements and the actual reliance on fake-website detection tools.
Few studies have examined how performance-related elements and cost of error could influence
users’ security perceptions and reliance on protective IT artifacts. We define protective IT artifacts as
a type of IT artifact that protects users from damages caused by malicious software and fake
websites. This definition is similar to Dinev and Hu’s (2007) but extended to explicitly include fake
websites. Given the significance of fake websites in terms of the hefty monetary loss and social costs
inflicted, such an extension is warranted (Dinev, 2006; Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & Menczer,
2007; Abbasi, Zhang, Zimbra, Chen, & Nunamaker, 2010; Xiao & Benbasat, 2011). Previous studies
have investigated how users react to the interfaces of fake-website detection tools (Wu et al., 2006)
and salient interface design elements for such tools (Chen, Zahedi, & Abbasi, 2011). Others have
analyzed the effectiveness of a particular warning message, such as the SSL warning (Sunshine,
Egelman, Almuhimedi, Atri, & Cranor, 2009) and new models or methods that assist with users’
security-critical decision making process (Cranor, 2008). These studies have been exploratory for the
most part and provide limited theoretical insights regarding individuals’ reactions. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is among the first to investigate the salient elements related to detection tools’
performance (benefit), cost of error, and context-sensitive factors (domain and threat types) that could
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influence people’s reliance on tools in protecting themselves against fake-website attacks. To do so,
we pose the following specific research questions: do a tool’s salient elements impact users’ reliance
on the tool and their self-protection performance? If so, what is the process by which such elements
alter users’ behaviors and self-protection performance? Do context-sensitive elements of detection
tools influence the above process?
In formulating the conceptual model to address the research questions, we draw on the protection
motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975; Rogers, 1983) and extend the theory by contextualizing it to
include context-specific factors salient to fake-website detection tools’ performance and users’ selfprotection performance. A novel experimental design, with extensive stimuli development using
carefully identified fake websites, guided the data collection for this study.
This paper makes important and novel theoretical and empirical contributions. Our research uncovers
the process by which the salient elements of fake-website detection tools influence users’ coping
appraisals, alter their threat perceptions, and impact their reliance on the tool and self-protection
performance. We extend protection motivation theory (PMT) to contextualize it to account for the
context-specificity of the salient tool elements and users’ reliance and performance as well as for the
context-sensitivity of domains and threat types. Based on this theoretical framework, our work shows
how fake-website detection tools’ performance-related elements must be enhanced and marketed to
promote their use. Particularly, tools’ benefits in terms of their accuracy and speed boost users’
coping appraisal and constitute critical factors in the design of detection tools. On the other hand, the
perceived cost of tools’ error increases users’ threat appraisals. The resultant users’ perceived
response and self-efficacy are the pivotal coping mechanism in dealing with security threats posed by
fake websites and are major conduits for transforming users’ perceptions of performance-related
elements into their increased reliance on such tools.

2. Theory Development
We base our theory development on the core constructs of protection motivation theory (PMT), which
we contextualize to fake-website threats and tools to counter them. We extend the core PMT
constructs to include tools’ performance (benefit) and cost of error, users’ reliance on the detector
and their success in self-protection against online threats. We refer to this contextualized PMT as the
detection tool impact (DTI) theory.
Whetten, Felin, and King (2009) categorize theory borrowing into two types: vertical and horizontal.
Vertical borrowing changes the level of analysis and abstraction, whereas horizontal borrowing
moves across contexts. We use the latter in this study. Contextualization has emerged as a valuable
approach in theory development, which makes it possible to identify distinguishing features and
boundary conditions of the theory (Whetten, 2009, Hong, Chan, Thong, Chasalow, & Dhillon, 2014),
which enhances the borrowed theory, contributes to the emergence of context-specific theories
(Whetten, 2009), and leads to a deeper understanding of the “why” and “where” of theory building
(Johns, 2006).
Whetten (2009, p. 29) distinguishes between “context specificity” and “context sensitivity” of theories.
Context specificity refers to the context in which the theory explains relationships among variables,
making the explanatory power of theory “conditional” on a specific context. Context specificity
enhances the application of a theory to new fields of inquiry. Context-sensitivity shows the sensitivity
of relationships to changes in context (Whetten, 2009). There are theories and core constructs that
are “paradigmatic” (as opposed to “propositional”), which are accepted lenses among the research
community because of their recurrent significance in extant applications. The threat and coping
appraisal constructs of PMT (Rogers, 1975; Rogers, 1983) constitute paradigmatic constructs since
their saliency has been established in multiple applications in various fields including health and IS
security. These constructs have demonstrated significant explanatory power in predicting security
behaviors (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Chen & Zahedi, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin 2010).
According to PMT and theories that were built on it—most notably the technology threat avoidance
theory proposed by Liang and Xue (2009)—security tools are avoidance mechanisms that help users
counter threats. As positive technology stimuli, security tools directly involve users’ cognitive
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 16, Issue 6, pp. 448-484, June 2015
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processes of avoiding threats and taking protective actions (Chen & Zahedi, 2009; Liang & Xue,
2009). PMT has been used in voluntary settings to study users’ decisions on protective behaviors
(e.g., Anderson & Agarwal 2010; Chen & Zahedi 2009). Hence, PMT constitutes an appropriate core
theory to investigate users’ online security behaviors.
PMT posits that humans’ protective behaviors involve two cognitive processes—threat appraisal and
coping appraisal. The principal variables in the threat appraisal process are the perceived
susceptibility to the threat (a perception about the extent of vulnerability to the threat) and the
perceived severity of the threat (a perception about the magnitude of possible harm if no
countermeasures are taken). The primary constructs in the coping appraisal process are response
efficacy (a belief in the effectiveness of the countermeasure) and coping self-efficacy (a belief in one’s
own ability to deal with the threat with countermeasures) (Rogers, 1975; Rogers, 1983).
We extend PMT by contextualizing it to fake-website threats and using detection tools to counter
them. This “specific” context adds several core constructs (X in XY) as antecedents of PMT’s threat
and coping appraisals. This specificity involves benefit and cost of detection tools, which provide an
opportunity to alter perceptions of threat and coping as well as consequent outcomes by manipulating
detection tools’ features. Another addition to context specificity in our theory is the extension of the
behavior outcomes to include reliance on detection tools in decisions to visit and interact with
websites and users’ self-protection performance, which make the right side (Y in XY) contextspecific. Context-specific X and Y are called Level 1 contextualization (Hong et al., 2014).
The Level 2 extension of a theory involves investigating how “sensitive” the specific theory is with
respect to “where” it is implemented (Whetten, 2009, Hong et al., 2014). In fake-website threats,
context-sensitivity could be explored from multiple perspectives, the more immediate of which are
threat and domain types. Fake-website detection tools could embody algorithms specially designed
for particular threat types and domains (type of websites with different products and services). From
users’ points of view, threat type and domain type could influence their perceptions and behaviors.
Therefore, our Level 2 extension of PMT is to investigate the “context sensitivity” of our theory with
respect to threat and domain types.

2.1. Contextualization of Outcomes
PMT proposes that, when individuals appraise the threat by assessing the susceptibility to and
severity of the threat and are confident in their coping ability (in terms of response efficacy and selfefficacy), they tend to take protective actions in terms of single or multiple actions (Rippetoe & Roger,
1987) or may adopt maladaptive behaviors, such as avoidance or wishful thinking (Milne, Sheeran, &
Orbell, 2000). In the IS studies that apply and extend PMT, the outcome of threat and coping
appraisals has been conceptualized as behavioral intent (Johnson & Warkentin, 2010) and avoidance
and emotion-focused coping (Liang & Xue, 2009).
In contextualizing PMT specific to fake-website threats and detector tools to counter them, we argue
that there are two types of outcomes: reliance on a tool in dealing with fake-website threats and the
success of individuals in self-protection. Individuals access the Web regularly, and in each access
they need to decide whether or not the website is fake. They may rely to a varying degree on the
detector in making this decision. Furthermore, the ultimate criterion for judging a detector’s
performance and users’ behaviors is the extent of users’ success in self-protection in the repeated
use of the detector. Therefore, user reliance and performance constitute the contextualization of the
outcome variables in the DTI theory.

2.2. Contextualization of Detector Benefit and Cost
To identify the salient elements for benefit and cost analysis of fake-website detection tools and
understand user reactions to such tools, we need to look into users’ cognitive process of detecting
deceptions when such tools are in place. According to the competence model of fraud detection
(Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal, & Berryman, 2001), a deception involves two parties with conflicting
interests, a deceiver and a target. The deceiver uses deceptive tactics to manipulate and
misrepresent cues of a situation that depart from the truth to induce a misjudgment by the target. The
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target, therefore, will behave in accordance with the deceiver’s manipulations and misrepresentations
(Johnson et al., 2001). To successfully detect deceptions, individuals need to detect the
inconsistencies between the cues manipulated and the truth. Thus, fake-website detection tools need
to enhance avoidance behavior by improving users’ propensity to notice and attribute deception (Xiao
& Benbasat, 2011). More specifically, effective fake-website detection tools need to facilitate
individuals’ cognitive process in arousing suspicion(s) about abnormalities (inconsistencies between
the cues manipulated and the truth), generating and evaluating hypotheses on the situation, and
reaching a conclusion about whether there is a deception (Johnson et al., 2001). In fake-website
detection, two broad categories of tool elements can facilitate such cognitive process: (1)
performance (benefit) and cost elements and (2) user interface elements. Performance and cost
elements play a critical role in activating users’ fraud detection cognitive process before they fall into
the deceiver’s manipulations; user interface elements communicate the tool’s findings and help users
detect manipulated and misrepresented cues and heed the tool’s warnings.
This paper is part of a larger federally funded research project that investigates both the performance
(benefit)/cost and user-interface elements of fake-website detection tools. In this paper, we report on
the first category of elements. Table 1 summarizes a selective set of studies relevant to our study. As
we elaborate below, based on the literature, we have identified salient performance-related elements
for fake-website detection tools as detector’ accuracy and runtime speed, which constitute the
benefits that users will derive from using such tools. However, no tool is perfect. Tools’ errors could
cost users in terms of financial damage or efforts to mitigate consequences of such errors; hence,
perceived cost of error is a salient element.
Table 1. Contextualization of Fake-Website Threats and Detection Tools
Study

Method

Performance
metrics

Study objective

Findings

Benefit: performance: accuracy and runtime speed
Abbasi et al.
(2010)
Experiment

Bliss, Gilson,
& Deaton
Experiment
(1995)

Investigating the match
between (i) warning
reliability and (ii) users’
response frequency,
speed, and accuracy
Studying impacts of
accuracy of an in-car
hazard warning
system on driving
performance

Warning reliability,
response
frequency, speed
& accuracy

90% of the subjects’
response frequency to the
warnings matched the
warning reliability

# of collisions &
Decreased accuracy of the
offroad accidents,
system negatively impacted
obeying traffic
driving performance and trust
laws, & perceived
in the system
accuracy
No single detection
Comparing the accuracy
technique emerged, tools’
of 10 popular fake
Class-level recall
performance varied
Experiment
website detection tools
depending on the data
sources
Cost: cost of detector’s error

Jonsson,
Harris, &
Experiment
Nass (2008)

Zhang et al.
(2007)

Overall accuracy, AZProtect using SLT-based
class-level
algorithm is more accurate in
precision, & class- detecting both spoofed and
level recall
concocted fake websites

Improving detection
accuracy for fake
website detection

Studying the
Cavusoglu,
organizational value of
Mathematic
Mishra, &
using detection
Raghunathan al modeling
systems based on a
(2005)
cost-benefit model

Damage caused
by an undetected
Using intrusion detection
intrusion, cost of
systems had positive values for
manual
organizations
investigation, and
utility of intrusion
detection
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Table 1. Contextualization of Fake-Website Threats and Detection Tools (cont.)
Study

Method

Performance
metrics
Cost: cost of detector’s error

Study objective

Comparing the
response cost of
Yue and
Response costs
clearing intrusion
Mathematic
Çakanyildirim
al modeling alarms when using and damage costs
(2007)
reactive vs. proactive
response strategies
Threat context-sensitivity
Improving fakePerformance
website detection
measures
Abbasi et al.
accuracy using
including overall
(2010)
Experiment learning classifiers
accuracy, classthat use more fraud
level precision,
cues and threat type
and class-level
information
recall
Overall accuracy
Studying impacts of
and class level FAbbasi &
threat type-specific
Experiment
measure,
Chen (2009b)
cues on fake website
precision, and
detection performance
recall
Improving online
review deception
Class-level
Lau et al.
detection accuracy by
misclassification
Experiment
(2011)
incorporating threatrates
type-specific
deception cues
Domain context-sensitivity
Studying how domain
experience and other
Deception
Biros,
focal factors impact
detection rate,
George, & Experiment
deception detection false alarms, and
Zmud (2002)
rate, false alarms, and task accuracy
task accuracy
Investigating the
Distributions of
Grazioli &
deceptive tactics used deception tactics
Content
by deceivers on the
Jarvenpaa
used in three
analysis
Internet in different
(2003)
domains: b2b,
domains
b2c, and c2c
Studying impacts of
involving cognitive
Domain-specific
Johnson et al.
Field
processes to
deceptive tactics
(2001)
experiment successfully evaluate
and cues, &
domain-specific
detection errors
deceptive tactics

Findings

An optimal response strategy
is a mixture of both reactive
and proactive responses and
depends on cost and
investigation rate parameters

AZProtect using SLT-based
algorithm is more accurate in
detecting both spoofed and
concocted fake websites when
threat type cues were fed into
the algorithm
Rich threat type-specific cues
along with a proper choice of
algorithms can improve
detection performance of fake
escrow websites
Using threat type- specific cues
can improve detection
performance of online review
deception

Domain experience was
positively associated with task
accuracy

Different types of deceivers
used different deceptive tactics
in different domains.
Employing the proposed
heuristics model (based on the
competence model of fraud
detection) successfully
detected frauds in the cases.

2.2.1. Benefit: Detector’s Accuracy and Speed
In many cases, security tasks are “secondary” to many users. They want the security task to get done
as quickly as possible so that they can go back to the primary task (Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst, 2006).
Therefore, security decisions are made under time pressure because they distract users from their
primary task. To help users make fast and accurate security decisions about visiting a website,
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detection tools should be able to provide timely and accurate detection results. With respect to
accuracy, the two types of errors associated with alarm systems are failing to detect a fake website
(alarm failures) and false alarms (Bliss et al., 1995; Edworthy, 1997). It has been reported that existing
fake-website detection tools suffer from significantly high alarm failures (i.e., low detection rates of fake
websites) (Zhang et al., 2007; Abbasi & Chen, 2009a). This is quite problematic since the potential
consequences of alarm failures can be quite devastating in terms of financial loss and identity theft
(Abbasi et al., 2010). Researchers have endeavored to develop algorithms for detection tools that can
deliver accurate and timely detection results (Abbasi et al., 2010). Therefore, accuracy and speed of
detector tools should be among the salient elements impacting users’ security behaviors.

2.2.2. Cost: Perceived Cost of Detector’s Error
Detection tools are evaluated based on their benefit and cost. Tools’ benefits stem from their ability to
detect fake websites, but their costs include the extent of users’ loss caused by the tools’ inability to
accurately detect the threat and the monetary consequences of such errors (Cavusoglu et al., 2005;
Abbasi et al., 2010). By following a detector’s false negative advice (failing to warn against a fake-website
attack), users could suffer costly damages such as identity theft (Dinev, 2006). Such failures impact users’
cost-benefit evaluation about a threat countermeasure (e.g., a detection tool) (Liang & Xue, 2009).
Considering that designers of detection tools can incorporate false negative costs (in the detection
methods) that are congruent with users’ perceptions, a deeper understanding of the impact of error costs
on user perceptions and behaviors is warranted; hence, cost of detector error is a salient element.

2.3. Threat Context-Sensitivity: Type of Threat the Detector Can Handle
Two prevalent types of fake websites that employ contrasting forms of deception (i.e., attack
strategies) are spoofed and concocted sites. These varying types of deception have important
implications for detecting fake websites (Xiao & Benbasat, 2011). Spoofed sites mimic well-known
existing websites. The purpose of these sites is online identity theft (Abbasi et al., 2010). Concocted
sites are deceptive websites attempting to appear as unique, legitimate online entities with the
objective of failure-to-ship fraud (Chua & Wareham, 2004; Abbasi et al., 2010). Currently, concocted
sites are becoming increasingly common, with thousands of new examples appearing daily on the
Internet (Airoldi & Malin, 2004; Greenberg, 2008). The two types of fake websites use different
deceptive tactics for successfully defrauding Internet users (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2003).
Consequently, users may behave differently when using detection tools in the context of spoofed
websites as compared to concocted websites. For instance, users often discount tool
recommendations when encountering spoofed websites that “appear familiar” (Wu et al., 2006).
Moreover, these two types have important implications for the design of fake-website detection tools.
Prior studies have noted that, due to the differences in the fraud tactics, many existing tools focus on
detecting only a single category and so provide limited support across both spoofed and concocted
sites (Abbasi et al., 2010). This limitation, coupled with the potential for variation in user behavior
when encountering spoofed and concocted websites, underscores the significance of including the
threat type as a salient element impacting users’ behaviors.

2.4. Domain Context-Sensitivity: Type of Domain the Detector Can Handle
Prior studies have demonstrated the influences of domain of use on Internet users’ behaviors.
Internet users’ decision to disclose private information depends on the website domains (Bansal,
Zahedi, & Gefen, 2008). In highly sensitive domains such as health and finance, users could show
“visceral feelings” about their private information and be reluctant to disclose (Angst & Agarwal, 2009,
p. 359). However, this might not be the case in relatively insensitive domains such as online news.
Meanwhile, even in highly sensitive domains such as online pharmacies or online banks, users might
have different threat and deception awareness based on their personal experiences and domain
knowledge (Kumaraguru et al., 2010). For instance, fake online pharmacies are highly successful due
to Internet users’ general lack of awareness about medical content pertaining to FDA regulations,
warnings regarding adverse drug reactions, and the prevalence of rogue Internet pharmacies
(Greenberg, 2008; White & Horvitz, 2009; Abbasi et al. 2012). Therefore, it is essential to study the
role of detection tools for the domains in which users have greater security concerns.
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3. Model Conceptualization and Hypothesis Development
Based on the DTI theory, we propose our conceptualized detection tool impact (DTI) model (See
Figure 1). Table 2 summarizes the constructs’ definitions. The model is a user-centric assessment of
how salient elements of the detection tool could change users’ reliance on the tool and their selfprotection performance.
According to PMT, individuals first appraise a threat (threat appraisal) and then assess ways to cope
with it (coping appraisal) (Liang & Xue, 2009). Coping appraisal includes individuals’ assessment of
their own abilities (self-efficacy) and the efficacy of response to the threat (response efficacy). During
the coping appraisal, individuals form their perceptions about the effectiveness of the
countermeasures and then consider personal effectiveness.

Figure 1. Detection Tool Impact (DTI) Model
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Table 2. Construct Definition and Source of Scale Development
Constructs

Definitions

Major references

Detector
response efficacy

Users’ belief about the effectiveness of
the tool in detecting fake websites

Liang & Xue (2009), Johnston &
Warkentin (2010), Rogers (1975), Witte,
Cameron, McKeon, & Berkowitz (1996)

Cost of detector Users’ perceptions regarding the financial
Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman
error
loss caused by the detector errors
(2002), Virta, Jacobson, & Kobza (2003)
Coping selfefficacy

Users’ beliefs of their own ability of taking
Bandura (1982), Rogers (1975), Witte et
security countermeasures to deal with
al. (1996)
fake website threats

Perceived threat
severity

Users’ beliefs about the magnitude of the Johnston & Warkentin (2010), Liang and
Xue 2009; Rogers 1975; Witte et al.
potential harm caused by visiting fake
1996
websites

Perceived threat
susceptibility

Users’ beliefs about their personal
possibility of encountering and/or visiting
fake websites

Johnston & Warkentin (2010), Liang &
Xue (2009), Rogers (1975), Witte et al.
(1996)

Reported reliance
on the detector

Users’ decision to follow the
recommendation of the detector in
making decisions regarding visiting or
transacting with a website

Davis (1989), Straub, Limayem, &
Karahanna (1995), Venkatesh, Morris,
Davis, & Davis (2003)

Actual
performance

Users’ actual success in identifying and
avoiding fake website attacks

Wu et al. (2006), Dhamija et al. (2006),
Adipat, Zhang, & Zhou (2011)

Applications of PMT have shown that threat appraisal and coping appraisal are two cognitive
mediating processes in individuals’ protective behaviors in health contexts (Rippetoe & Rogers,
1987). In contextualizing PMT, the DTI theory argues that, in coping appraisal for dealing with fake
website threats, users need to rely on the efficacy of both detection tools and their own coping
abilities in dealing with the threat.
Per the DTI theory, the detector’s performance elements are accuracy and speed, which benefit its
users. A tool’s response efficacy is an important component of coping appraisal because an effective
tool that can identify and prevent fake-website attacks gives users peace of mind when visiting the
Web. A protective IT artifact’s ability to accurately detect threats impacts users’ perceptions of the
artifact (Sunshine et al., 2009). In the context of fake websites, less accurate detectors have been
associated with lower perceived response efficacy (Li & Helenius, 2007; Abbasi et al., 2010).
“Warning fatigue”, “crying wolf”, and “alarm failure” are all examples of observed low perceived
response efficacy effects attributable to poor detector accuracy (Bliss et al., 1995; Egelman, Cranor,
& Hong, 2008; Sunshine et al., 2009; Akhawe & Felt, 2013). Conversely, other studies have shown
that higher detector accuracy can improve perceived detector response efficacy (Wu et al., 2006;
Herzberg & Jbara, 2008). Thus,
H1: Detector’s accuracy is positively associated with users’ perceived detector response
efficacy.
Self-efficacy is defined as beliefs about “one’s capability to organize and execute the course of action
required to produce attainment” (Bandura, 1997, p. 3). Self-efficacy has been shown to promote
various behaviors (Bandura, 1982; Bandura, Adams, & Beyer, 1977) and appears in PMT as a part of
coping appraisal. Due to the limitation of resources available for an action (such as paying attention to
the advice of a detector while engaged in a primary task), a cost-benefit evaluation of taking the
action could also improve or diminish self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982; Bandura et al., 1977; Marks &
Allegrante, 2005; Strecher, DeVellis, Becker, & Rosenstock, 1986). Performance achievement is one
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of the major sources of self-efficacy. Success gives people a sense of mastering the situation
(Bandura et al., 1977). The literature in health-related behaviors shows that individuals’ self-efficacy
could be enhanced through deliberate manipulations, which subsequently lead to behavior
improvements in areas such as smoking cessation, weight control and alcohol abuse (see Strecher et
al. (1986) for a review). Furthermore, Compeau and Higgins (1995) have shown that individuals’
computer self-efficacy can be improved by others’ encouragement, use, and support. Similarly, Lam
and Lee (2006) have shown that others’ encouragement and support influence internet self-efficacy
for older adults. Extending these arguments to detection tools, we argue that the accuracy of the tool
influences users’ coping self-efficacy since a more accurate tool provides users a stronger sense of
ability to cope with online threats. Thus,
H2: Detector’s accuracy is positively associated with users’ coping self-efficacy.
Prior studies have recognized the importance of detector run-time on user perceptions of the tool
(Xiang, Hong, Rose, & Cranor, 2011). Simply put, faster tools have been considered superior
performers (Chou, Ledesma, Teraguchi, Boneh, & Mitchell, 2004). Run-time speed has been one of
the major metrics for measuring the performance of detection tools mostly due to the secondary
nature of fake-website detection in real-time user environments (Abbasi et al., 2010). When the
detector has a long process time, it could interfere with individuals’ primary purpose for visiting
websites, costing them time and focus while waiting for the detector to run and return its results
(Dhamija et al., 2006). As Kumaraguru et al. (2010) note, “one does not go to an online banking Web
site to check the SSL implementation of the Web site, but rather to perform a banking transaction” (p.
2). Consequently, in real-time detection environments with users constantly awaiting tool
recommendations, fast run-time speed is “crucial” for maintaining favorable user perceptions of tool
performance (Abbasi & Chen, 2009b, p. 100). Hence,
H3: Detector’s run-time speed is positively associated with users’ perceived response
efficacy.
Humans strive to have control over their environments. Self-efficacy enables them to exercise
personal control (Bandura, 1997). Control over time has been shown to play a major role in workers’
stress, satisfaction, and performance in organizational studies (Macan, 1994), which has led to the
concept of “time congruity” (Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 2003). Time congruity is the agreement
between individuals’ style of using time with the time demand under which they work. Studies have
shown that interruptions (such as those caused by supervisors) lead to the perception of poor time
control (Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 2003; Chen, Zhang, Leung, & Zhou, 2010). Applying these
findings to the context of fake-website detectors, we argue that the run time of the detector is an
interruption that can reduce individuals’ time congruity in performing their primary tasks of web
access and use. A detector’s fast runtime reduces the extent of this interruption and, hence,
preserves individuals’ time congruity and promotes a sense of control over their environment, which,
in turn, positively influences their coping self-efficacy. Thus,
H4: Detector’s speed is positively associated with users’ perceived coping self-efficacy.
The PMT assumes that people indeed assess expected benefits and costs and that this assessment
plays a role in their threat appraisal (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; Weinstein, 1988). Cost includes the
“effort in carrying out a precaution, the expense, any undesirable side effects” (Weinstein, 1988, p.
365). In the DTI theory, one side effect of using the detector is the perceived cost of its error. Hence,
we argue that the assessment of cost due to detector error is a part of the cost-benefit analysis, which
initiates threat and coping appraisals because people tend to first make more general cost
assessments of a protective action and then move to more personally related assessments such as
whether they are exposed to a given threat in terms of the severity of and susceptibility to the threat
(Weinstein, 1988).
The cost of detection error is damaging to those who follow the system’s incorrect recommendations
(Cavusoglu et al., 2005). Models for detecting security threats have often leveraged perceived
misclassification costs, which are closely aligned with perceived threat severity (Lee, Fan, Miller,
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Stolfo, & Zadok, 2002). For instance, in the context of intrusion detection systems (Lee et al., 2002; p.
6), the perceived cost of detection error is related to the perceived “cost of damage caused by an
intrusion.” Similarly, perceptions about costs of a failure to detect a phishing email are related to the
perceived severity of the attack (Abu-Nimeh, Nappa, Wang, & Nair, 2007). Consequently, users’
perceived costs associated with detection errors impact their perceptions about the severity of the
threat. Hence,
H5: Perceived cost of detector error is positively associated with users’ perceived threat
severity.
Research has found that automatic tools’ errors can impact users’ perceptions of the tools’
creditability and capability and the users’ consequent behaviors (Rice, 2009). According to PMT, an
assessment of expected costs when taking the recommended countermeasure plays an influential
role in users’ cognitive processes of making decisions about the threat (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987;
Weinstein, 1988). In the specific context of fake-website detention tools, the DTI theory posits that
cost of detector error triggers users to reassess their vulnerability to fake website threats. Higher
perceived costs reduce users’ beliefs that the protective tool will safeguard them (Liang & Xue, 2009,
2010). The uncertainty caused by perceived cost of error adds to the perceived likelihood of threat
and increases users’ anxiety about their threat exposure because they have to contend with two
sources of threat: fake-website threat and threat of costly error. Thus, perceived cost of error can
compound users’ sense of being vulnerable and defenseless against attack.
H6: Perceived cost of detector error is positively associated with users’ perceived threat
susceptibility.
One of the two dependent variables in this study is the extent of reliance on the tool as reported by
users. While intention to use IT artifacts has been a commonly used dependent variable in studying
users’ behaviors and IT adoption, for security tools, actual use is the gold standard. Taking precaution
against a threat is a decision and has a dynamic process (Weinstein, 1988). Expressing intention
does not necessarily capture the decision in the hazard condition when an individual actually comes
face to face with a specific threat because “many people who claim to be convinced that a precaution
is worthwhile, admit that they have yet to carry through on their intentions” (Weinstein, 1988, p. 374).
Weinstein (1988) gives an example of individuals who intend to stop smoking but never carry out the
intention until coming face to face with the specific threat of lung cancer. Contextualizing this
argument for using the detector as a precaution, we argue that the actual reliance on a detection tool
in a specific condition of threat is a more salient measure of actual use. Hence, reported reliance in
this study refers to the individual’s decision to follow the recommendation of the tool in making
decisions regarding visiting or transacting with a website.
In PMT, the threat appraisal (threat susceptibility and severity) as well as coping mechanism (coping
self-efficacy and response efficacy) are behavior antecedents. In the DTI theory, these core
constructs impact the context-specific outcomes—users’ reliance on the detector, which, in turn,
influences users’ self-protection performance. Hence, we posit that threat appraisal and coping
appraisal influence users’ reliance on the detector. Detector response efficacy represents users’
beliefs that the tool is effective and accurate. As a coping mechanism, an effective tool should
encourage more use. In design science it has been observed that “users should have accurate beliefs
about the reliability of automation” (Parasuraman & Miller, 2004, p. 52). In the IS field, numerous
studies have demonstrated that a reliable tool is an important antecedent for use and intention to use
the IT artifact (e.g., McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002; Vance, Elie-Dit-Cosaque, & Straub,
2008; Zahedi & Song, 2008). In the context of online security, one can argue response efficacy is a
salient measure of the reliability of a detection tool. Specifically in the context of fake websites,
perceived detector response efficacy has been theorized as a likely predictor of tool reliance (Cranor
2008). Users with low perceived detector response efficacy may choose to ignore or disregard tool
warnings (Egelman et al., 2008). A recent large-scale fake-website detection study suggests that
users’ reliance on detection tool warnings can vary by between 40% and 60% purely based on their
perceived detector response efficacy (Akhawe & Felt, 2013). Hence,
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H7: The extent of users’ reported reliance on the detector is positively associated with
perceived detector response efficacy.
Self-efficacy is “the strength of convictions” in one’s own ability, which determines whether “coping
behavior will be attempted” (Bandura, 1982; Bandura et al., 1977, p. 126). Numerous studies have
shown that self-efficacy in taking protective actions to deal with a threat is an antecedent of
behavioral change (e.g., Rippetoe & Rogers 1987; Witte et al., 1996) and a major determinant of
security-related behaviors (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Chen & Zahedi, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin,
2010; Liang & Xue, 2009). Specifically in the context on security warnings, self-efficacy has also been
theorized as having a positive relation with security tool reliance (Cranor, 2008). Thus,
H8: The extent of users’ reported reliance on the detector is positively associated with
their perceived self-efficacy.
It is observed that people will not take protective actions against a threat unless they feel vulnerable
(Weinstein, 1988; Witte et al., 1996). Therefore, we should expect that higher levels of threat
susceptibility and severity should prompt individuals to rely more on the detector’s recommendation
(Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Chen & Zahedi, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2009).
The influence of threat severity on reliance stems from the argument that, as the magnitude of harm
caused by visiting fake websites increases, users are more likely to seek to protect themselves by
relying on the detector. There is evidence in the fake-website detection literature to support this
argument. Downs, Holbrook, and Cranor (2007) observed that, when encountering fake websites,
users with higher perceived threat severity for having their information stolen were more likely to take
protective actions. Egelman et al. (2008) performed a qualitative analysis of users that relied heavily
on fake-website detectors and found one of the most common user-reported reasons to be high
perceived threat severity, with responses such as: (1) “didn’t want to get burned”, (2) “don’t like to
gamble with the little money I have”, and (3) “better to be safe than sorry”. In general, when
encountering a potential fake-website, users’ perceptions of the threat, and the resulting judgments,
are critical pre-requisite considerations to any protective behavior such as detector reliance (Camp,
2009; Bravo-Lillo, Cranor, Downs, & Komanduri, 2011). Hence,
H9: The extent of users’ reported reliance on the detector is positively associated with
perceived threat severity.
Threat susceptibility is another component of threat appraisal. People normally do not pay attention to
adverse events that they perceive as rare or unlikely to impact them (Rogers, 1975). Similarly, “if an
IT threat is perceived to have no chance of occurring, there should be no interest in acting against it”
(Liang & Xue, 2009, p. 81). Perceived vulnerability to fake-website attacks is considered an important
variable impacting users’ likelihood of taking protective actions (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006).
When using security tools to protect against fake-websites, low perceived threat susceptibility has
been observed as a major cause for ignoring or disregarding tool warnings (Wu et al., 2006). Users
have to feel vulnerable to a fake-website threat in order to pay attention to the detector’s warnings
and follow its advice. Thus,
H10: The extent of users’ reported reliance on the detector is positively associated with
perceived threat susceptibility.
In the literature of security research, the users’ performance when using a protection tool is rarely
assessed. Some studies have developed models to assess system performance when using
protective resources (Basagiannis, Katsaros, Pombortsis, & Alexiou, 2009). It also has been reported
that not using tools that prevent security attacks resulted in spoof rates as high as 30-45 percent (Wu
et al., 2006). However, to our knowledge, there has not been any study on developing conceptual
models for assessing individual security performance when using detection tools. We address this
gap by including users’ performance assessment as the second dependent variable in our model. We
argue that security performance enhancement is the ultimate goal of developing any security tool.
People generally are poor at detecting deceptions; relying on tools could help improve their detection
rates (Biros et al., 2002; DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985). Thus, using the detection tool in making
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decisions about visiting a website or transacting with the website should improve users’ performance
in avoiding the fake-website security threats. Hence,
H11: Users’ actual performance in avoiding fake websites is positively associated with
the extent of reported reliance on the detector.

3.1. Context-Sensitivity of Domain and Threat Types
Whetten (2009) distinguishes between “specificity” and “sensitivity” of context in theory building (p.
29). In our case, while the DTI theory is “specific” to online security threats and the role of detection
tools in preventing them, its “sensitivity” should be tested within different types of domains in which
people feel threatened and may rely on the detector to prevent security threats. People use the Web
for different purposes and tasks, some of which are more sensitive and critical than others.
Consequently, Internet users’ security-related perceptions and behaviors may vary depending on web
domains (Angst & Agarwal, 2009; Bansal et al., 2008). In our case, due to differences in the nature
and impacts of website frauds in online banks and pharmacies (Armin, 2010, Easton, 2007; Lennon,
2011), users may be more sensitive to online banks than online pharmacies since they may suffer
immediate financial loss from fake online banks.
Following Johns (2006), we define domain type as “situational opportunities and constraints” that
could influence individuals’ security behaviors and “functional relationships between variables” (p.
386). Domain type establishes the “when” aspect of theory building—one of the omnibus dimensions
of context identified by Johns (2006), and constitutes the condition under which strengths of
relationships in DTI theory are examined. Per Whetten (2009), the DTI theory is a “conditional”
explanation in that use domain could modify the benefit and cost impact of the detector and users’
eventual reliance on it. Whetten (2009) argues that, if a variable (Z) measuring context-sensitivity
impacts X (in XY), then it should be conceptualized as a moderator, whereas if Z impacts only Y,
then it should be used as a control variable.
We use two variables to study the context-sensitivity of our theory: domain type and threat type.
People use the Internet in different domains for different purposes. A sensitive domain involves the
exchange of people’s sensitive private information. Security attacks in such domains could pose
serious monetary or personal damages. We posit that people’s perceptions and behaviors are
affected by the sensitivity of the domain. Therefore, domain should moderate the paths in the model.
In accessing a sensitive website, users tend to have a high degree of awareness about the type of
website domain. Research has shown that when users access websites in sensitive domains, they
feel more vulnerable (SAP, 2013). We argue that users’ acute awareness of domain type influences
their expectation of detection tools’ benefits and costs. For example, users who have online bank
accounts are far more aware of the fake-website threats to their finance, and, hence, expect a higher
level of performance from detection tools in order to use them. Hence, we investigate contextsensitivity of domain type as a moderator of the DTI paths.
We explore this moderation through concentrating on two important domains: online pharmacies and
online banks. We selected these domains since health- and money-related activities are both
sensitive domains with significant online activity and prevalence of fake website-based fraud. Internet
fraud often occurs as a result of unsuspecting Internet users providing personal information to fake
websites in exchange for fictitious products and/or services (Chua & Wareham, 2004; Abbasi et al.,
2010, 2012). Financial institution websites are among the most common domains for fake website
attacks (Ramzan & Wuest, 2007). For instance, fake online banks are highly successful at luring
victims using the ruse of offering attractive escrow services, bank accounts, currency exchange, small
business loans, philanthropic ventures, and so on (Abbasi & Chen, 2009b). Similarly, fraudulent
online pharmacies are highly pervasive. According to studies conducted by the World Health
Organization and U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 11,000 of the 12,000 online pharmacies
examined were websites engaging in a variety of fraudulent activities, including failure-to-ship, identity
theft, and sale of counterfeit products; and the number of people visiting such websites continues to
increase dramatically (Krebs, 2005; Easton, 2007; Greenberg, 2008).
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In the case of online banks, the financial loss due to fake-website attacks is more immediate and
impactful. Cash thefts from individual accounts could be discovered faster and are more visible,
whereas, in the case of online pharmacies, there are a variety of impacts such as non-delivery,
identity theft, and exposure to fake drugs, which are less visible and could take longer to discover.
Therefore, depending on the immediacy and consequences of attacks, individuals may have different
appraisals of threats and their coping capabilities. The way individuals behave in one type of domain
may not necessarily be the same as their behavior in a different domain type. Therefore, domain type
could moderate the impacts the detector’s cost and benefit on individuals’ appraisals of threats and
coping efficacy as well as the paths leading to their reliance on the detector. The moderating
influence of domain type on the model paths is exploratory at this point since the conditional
manifestations of such moderation are yet to be explored.
H12: Domain type, online banks vs. online pharmacies, moderates the DTI paths.
When it comes to threat type, users have little knowledge of threat types and the ways fake websites
could deceive them. Therefore, users’ expectations of benefit and cost of detection tools or their
perceived threat and coping appraisals could not be influenced by threat type. However, detection
tools’ success in dealing with the two threat types may differ. The variance in detection performance
influences users’ self-protection success; thus, threat type impacts Y only. Following Whetten’s
(2009) argument, we use threat type as a control variable that impacts users actual performance.

3.2. User Profiles as Control Variables
In a user-centered design approach, identifying and understanding user profile variables and
individual differences that play a role in users’ perceptions and behaviors regarding system design
features are critical to the successful design of personalized systems (Kramer, Noronha, & Vergo,
2000). In the IS behavior literature as well as the PMT literature, demographic variables, including
age, gender, and education are included as profile variables (e.g., Venkatesh et al., 2003). Age has
been shown to be a salient factor in the application of PMT (Sturges & Rogers, 1996). Experiencerelated individual differences, including past encounters with fake websites and familiarity with the
domain and websites, are also part of user profiles (Bansal, Zahedi, & Gefen, 2010; Chen & Zahedi,
2009; Zahedi & Song, 2008). Security habit, defined as users’ routine security behaviors without
conscious intention, is an influencing factor impacting users’ security perceptions and behaviors
(Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006). In Weinstein’s (1988) study, survey respondents reported “not habitual”
as the one of the main reasons for not carrying out precaution intentions. Habit contributes to the
sense of coping self-efficacy. We therefore included security habit as a control variable in users’
profiles. Moreover, the literature on threat perception indicates that threat awareness plays a
significant role in security behavior (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Straub & Welke, 1998) and is associated with
the perception of susceptibility to a threat (Smerecnik, Mesters, de Vries, & de Vries, 2009). We have
included the awareness as a control associated with susceptibility.

4. Research Methodology
4.1. Experimental Design and Protocol
The research methodology was controlled lab experiment. We chose this methodology in order to
examine the actual behaviors of individuals in using the detector. The experimental design was a 2 x
2 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 32 full-factorial design: tool’s accuracy, tool’s runtime speed, loss due to tool’s error,
domain type, and threat type. Each factor had two levels. The detection tool’s accuracy was high vs.
low (90% vs. 60%), the runtime was fast vs. slow (1 vs. 4 seconds), the loss due to the detection error
was high vs. low ($10 vs. $1), the domain types were online pharmacies vs. online banks, and the
type of threat was either spoofed or concocted. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the 32
settings.
We chose the accuracy rates based on recent benchmarking studies reporting that the accuracies for
commonly used state-of-the-art anti-phishing tools range from approximately 60 percent to 90 percent
(Abbasi et al., 2010). This range encompasses the tools employed by the Internet Explorer and
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Firefox web browsers, which collectively account for nearly 80 percent of the browser market share
(Vaughan-Nichols, 2011). Since these commonly used tools have negligible false alarm rates (Abbasi
& Chen, 2009a), the errors associated with the 60 percent and 90 percent accurate detectors were
primarily alarm failures (i.e., failing to detect a fake website). We chose the times (1 and 4 seconds)
based on existing anti-phishing tools that have run times ranging from just under 1 second to slightly
over 3 seconds (Chou et al., 2004; Abbasi & Chen, 2009a). Median losses attributable to fake
websites range from approximately $300 for those suffering only direct monetary losses to $3,000 for
those that are also victims of identity theft, with the latter number including remediation and reputation
costs (Lennon, 2011; McAfee, 2011b). To operationalize these two possible costs (i.e., low: $300 and
high: $3000), we provided subjects with a virtual cash box of $100 and a damage cost (per error) of
either $1 or $10. Subjects could incur total losses up to $200, resulting in a final cash box balance
between -$100 and $100. Such a range of cash box values, which included the possibility of negative
balances, was adopted since losses attributable to fake websites can often extend beyond the
victims’ current means (Lennon, 2011; McAfee, 2011b).
At the end of the experiment, subjects were made aware of their remaining cash box balance. These
cash box and cost values allowed the proportions of low to high costs and between costs and median
U.S. household income to be preserved while using numbers that were easier for the subjects to
understand. The threat type was not part of the manipulation. Per the theoretical discussion, the
threat type was included as a control variable to examine whether behaviors in response to the tool’s
salient elements varied based on the type of threat (spoofed vs. concocted).
We conducted the experiment in two domain types: online pharmacies and online banks. An
inventory of 15 spoofed, 15 concocted, and 15 legitimate online pharmacies was identified—a total of
45 online pharmacies. The URLs for the legitimate, concocted, and spoofed pharmacy websites were
obtained from reputable sources including the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy
(www.nabp.net), LegitScript (www.legitscript.com), and PhishTank (www.phishtank.com). The web
pages associated with each website URL were collected using a spidering program that preserved
the original link structure, content, and images. An inventory of 15 spoofed, 15 concocted, and 15
legitimate online banks was also created—a total of 45 websites. The URLs for the legitimate,
spoofed, and concocted online banks were obtained from reputable sources including Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), (www.fdic.gov), PhishTank (www.phishtank.com), Artists
Against 4-1-9 (http://wiki.aa419.org) and Escrow Fraud Prevention (http://escrow-fraud.com/).
To balance subjects’ familiarity with legitimate websites and avoid the company-size bias, the
legitimate online pharmacies and online banks had an equal number of large, medium and small
companies. Size was determined based on sales revenue for pharmacies and total dollar amount of
deposits for banks. In other words, legitimate websites included approximately five from the top 1020, another five from the middle, and five smaller companies.
Data for the two domains was collected in two rounds of data collection since the experiment included
domain-specific tasks and utilized surveys that had domain-specific questions (such as familiarity with
websites). Combining the two domains could create confusion in training the subjects prior to the
experiment. We made sure that there was no overlap between subjects participating in the two
rounds of data collection.
The entire experimental process was developed from scratch in an integrated environment using Java
programming language. The experimental stimulus was developed from scratch using Java
programming to simulate different conditions of fake website attacks and different tool settings in terms
of accuracy, speed, cost of error, domain, and threat type. Figure 4 shows an example of the detection
interface. Note that, in each case, the URL was shown to the user but is masked in this figure.
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Figure 2. An Example of the Detection Interface (the URL is Masked)
For the online-pharmacies domain, the performance of fake-website detector was based on one of
the 16 possible designs. The designs were randomly assigned to the participants. Prior to the start of
the experiment, the participants were trained about the domains, the sequence of the experiment and
the detection process.
The participants were randomly assigned to 10 websites (5 legitimate and 5 fake—either spoofed or
concocted). The experimental task was to buy an over-the-counter drug with a value of about $30
(Rogaine, a hair regrowth product), for grandpa. This product was chosen because it is an over-thecounter product with which people are familiar (or could quickly be made familiar), and its counterfeits
are commonly sold by fake online pharmacies at a lower price. For each website, after being exposed
to the tool’s recommendation, participants had to decide if they would visit the website, and once on
the website, the participants had to decide if they would explore the website to find the product and,
once found, if they would buy the product.
For the online-banks domain, the experimental task was to open a saving account. This is a relevant
and basic function available on most online banks. Providing personal and financial information to a
fake website poses great risk of financial loss and identity theft. Accordingly, for each assigned bank
website, the participants had to make three decisions: whether the website was real or fake, whether
the website allowed one to open a saving account (if they visited), and whether they would open a
saving account with this online bank (if it allowed one to open a saving account online).
The experimental protocol was intended to mimic real conditions of use with respect to time limitation
and possible loss. The participants had 20 minutes to make all their decisions regarding their 10
assigned websites. This time constraint was chosen after pre-testing and pilot testing in order to
mimic the time limitation for making decisions and to ensure that the allotted time was reasonable for
making threat assessment.
Visiting and transacting with phishing websites have costly consequences, such as failure-to-ship
fraud, identity theft, and exposure to viruses and malware (Dinev, 2006). Incentives or disincentives
are also important in motivating people to take the proper security precautions (Cranor, 2008).
Therefore, participants were informed in advance that they would be awarded based on their
performance. Participants’ performances were scored objectively based on their 20 decisions
regarding their assigned websites: (1) ability to differentiate 10 legitimate websites from fakes
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(Dhamija et al., 2006; Wu et al., 2006), (2) decision to visit or avoid 5 fake websites, and (3)
willingness to transact with 5 fake websites (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa 2000). Each participant’s actual
performance score was computed as the percentage of correct decisions.
Participants were rewarded based on their performance scores either in cash (gift card) or course
credits (per each participant’s expressed preference). Cash payment involved $10 for participation
plus up to an additional $20 based on the subject's decision performance. The extra credit involved
0.5% extra credit plus up to 1% additional extra credit based on the subject’s decision performance.
The additional amount of cash or extra credit earned was directly proportional to the participants’
actual performance. Of 865 participants, 701 (81%) chose extra credit and 164 (19%) chose cash
payment. We carried out a t-test for the mean difference between the performance scores of subjects
based on the two types of incentives. The t-test was not statistically significant. Therefore, the data
from both groups were combined and used in the analysis.
The protocol involved three stages. In Stage 1, prior to the experiment, the participants answered
questions regarding their past experience, their profiles, and other pre-experiment questions. Stage 2
involved the experiment during which data on participants’ actions and decisions were collected. At
Stage 3, after the completion of the experiment, the participants continued with the online survey to
answer manipulation check questions, their familiarity with the domain and with the assigned
websites in the experiment, and remaining perceptual questions in the instrument. The experiment
was controlled by an extensive software tool specifically designed and implemented for this study. It
was written in Java and was administered via the local area network in order to protect the computer
systems from potential threats caused by visiting the concocted and spoofed websites. The
experiment lasted about 50 minutes.

4.2. Scale Development
Whenever possible, the measurement scales for the constructs in the DTI model were adopted from
literature and modified for the current study. All items were converted to semantic differential scales
to ensure content validity and to reduce of the threat of common method variance (Chin, Johnson, &
Schwarz, 2008; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Lee, 2003). Table 2 reports the construct definitions and
major sources for scale development, and Appendix A contains the details of the instrument. The
measurement items for perceived threat susceptibility, perceived threat severity, user perceived
response efficacy, and perceived self-efficacy in taking countermeasures to deal with fake websites
were adapted from Witte et al. (1996). The items for reported reliance on the detector were adapted
from Davis (1989), Straub et al. (1995) and Venkatesh et al. (2003). The items for cost of detector
error were developed for this study. User perceptions regarding the detector’s accuracy and speed
were measured by a single item.
All the scales for the profile variables were also adopted from literature and modified for this study.
The items for the security habit were adapted from Pavlou and Fygenson (2006). The items for past
encounters with fake websites were adapted from Chen and Zahedi (2009). Gender, age, and
education were measured by a one-item scale. Familiarity with the domain and familiarity with each
website were measured by one item developed for this study. As previously alluded to, actual user
performance was measured objectively by assessing participants’ decisions.

4.3. Pretest, Pilot Test, and Data Collection
The experiment protocol and the instrument were pretested and pilot-tested as recommended by the
literature (Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub, 2001; Straub, 1989). All the construct items, the experiment
protocol, and experiment instructions were pretested with two faculty members and two PhD
students. Based on their feedback, we refined the constructs and clarified the wording of the survey
instruments and the experiment instructions. A faculty and a PhD student pretested the experiment
protocol, process, and timing. Pilot tests involved two sets. For the online-pharmacies domain, the
experiment was pilot tested with 28 participants. For the online-banks domain, there were two rounds
of pilot tests, involving 6 and 26 participants, respectively. Pilot-test participants were recruited from
the campus of a Midwestern university.
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After completing each pilot test, the participants were asked to respond to a set of open-ended
questions regarding the clarity and timing of the experiment and instructions as well as the questions
in the survey instrument. The survey instrument, experiment procedure and instructions were
modified based on the pilot tests. Using the pilot data, we conducted initial manipulation checks and
found all manipulations to be successful.
Eight hundred and sixty-five participants from students and staff in a large Midwestern university
participated in the experiment—437 participated in the online-pharmacies domain, and 428
participated in the online-banks domain. Table 3 reports the profile information for the two domains.
Table 3. Participant Profiles
Profile
variables
Age
Education*
Hours spent
daily on the
Internet

Mean

STD

Pharm
(n = 437)
22.4
3.2

Bank
(n = 428)
20.5
3.0

Pooled
(n = 865)
21.5
3.1

Pharm
(n = 437)
5.6
0.9

Bank
(n = 428)
4.0
0.8

Pooled
(n = 865)
4.9
0.9

3.7

3.6

3.7

1.1

1.0

1.0

Gender

Male (%)
64.3%

60.0%

Female (%)
62.2%

35.7%

40.0%

37.8%

* Education scales, 1 = Some school, no degree, 2 = High school graduate, 3 = Some college, no degree/college students, 4 =
Professional degree/2-year associate degree, 5 = Bachelor’s degree, 6 = Master’s degree, 7 = Doctoral degree.

5. Analysis and Results
5.1. Manipulation and Saliency Checks
In the post-experiment survey, participants were asked to assess the detector’s run time speed,
accuracy and the cost of making one wrong decision based on what they had experienced in the
experiment, which we had manipulated during the experiment. Table 4 reports the results of three
ANOVA tests for the two samples as well as the pooled sample.
The results supported the success of manipulation. Furthermore, regression analyses of response
efficacy, coping self-efficacy, effort requirement, and loss due to detector error with the corresponding
tool elements (accuracy, speed, and cost of error) had statistically significant coefficients in all the
three samples (pharmacies, banks, and pooled). This indicated that participants formed their
perceptions of tool elements based on the manipulated values of these elements.
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Table 4. Manipulation Checks for Tool Elements
Manipulation

Assessment
questiona

Means (STD)
Level 1

Level 2

F-Value (d.f.)

Sig. diff.

Detection time
(1 vs. 4
seconds)

The detection
time of the tool
was:

Phb
Bk
Pl

1.84 (1.82)
2.08 (2.12)
1.96 (1.98)

4.11 (1.24)
4.39 (1.47)
4.25 (1.37)

223.08*** (1, 418)
170.67*** (1, 426)
383.48*** (1,846)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Detection
accuracy (60%
vs. 90%)

The tool
accuracy was:

Ph
Bk

0.57 (0.16)
0.59 (0.17)

0.73 (0.23)
0.77 (0.20)

70.32*** (1, 415)
105.15*** (1, 426)

Yes
Yes

Pl

0.59 (0.16)

0.75 (0.20)

172.18*** (1, 843)

Yes

Ph
Bk
Pl

2.64 (3.29)
2.75 (3.14)
2.69 (3.21)

9.81(1.65)
9.87 (1.60)
9.84 (1.62)

807.37*** (1,423)
873.81*** (1,426)
1682.18*** (1, 851)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Cost per wrong
The cost of
decision ($1 vs.
making one
$10)
wrong decision
was:
a

The lead part of those assessment questions is “When it comes to some features of the tool you just experienced in the
experiment”; b Ph = pharmacy (n = 437), Bk = bank (n = 428), and Pl = pooled (n = 865); *** p<0.001.

5.2. Validity and Reliability Checks
We carried out exploratory factor analyses (EFA) to check the convergent and discriminant validity of
the constructs in the pharmacies and banks samples, as recommended by the literature (Anderson &
Gerbing, 1982; Moore & Benbasat, 1991; Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004). All measurement items
correctly loaded on the corresponding constructs. Appendix B reports all item loadings are greater
than 0.70, and no cross loadings are greater than 0.40 (McKnight et al., 2002). Therefore, the
convergent and discriminant validities of the constructs were supported.
Table 5 reports the results of reliability checks. Cronbach alpha values were greater than the cutoff
value of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978), and composite factor reliability (CFR) values were above the
threshold of 0.70 (Segars 1997). The average variance extracted (AVE) values were above the cutoff
value of 0.50 (Segars, 1997). Hence, the reliability checks support the reliability of the constructs.
Table 5. Construct Reliability Checks
Constructs

Pharmacy

Bank

Cronbach's α

CFR

AVE

Cronbach's α

CFR

AVE

Detector response
efficacy
Coping self-efficacy

.97

.97

.91

.97

.97

.92

.93

.93

.81

.93

.93

.81

Threat severity
Threat susceptibility
Reliance on the
detector
Cost of error

.93
.94
.94

.93
.94
.94

.81
.83
.84

.93
.94
.94

.93
.94
.94

.82
.84
.85

.87

.87

.69

.86

.86

.68

By comparing the square root of the AVE for each construct with its correlations with all other
constructs, we checked for further evidence of the discriminant validity of the constructs. The square
root of AVE for each construct was greater than the correlation values with other constructs (Table 6),
further supporting the discriminant validity of the constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).
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Table 6. Construct Correlations and Comparison with Square Root of AVEs
Constructs (Pharmacy)
1. Threat susceptibility
2. Threat severity
3. Reliance on the detector
4. Cost of error
5. Detector response efficacy
6. Coping self-efficacy
Constructs (Bank)
1. Threat susceptibility
2. Threat severity
3. Reliance on the detector
4. Cost of error
5. Detector response efficacy
6. Coping self-efficacy
a

1
0.91 a

2

3

4

0.28
0.05
0.15

0.90
0.03
0.10

-0.05

0.94

-0.01
-0.01
1
0.92

-0.03
0.02
2

0.53
0.21
3

-0.21
-0.31
4

0.16
0.04

0.91
0.15

0.92

-0.02
0.01
0.04

0.22
0.14
0.02

-0.07
0.48
0.14

5

6

0.92
0.83
0.25
5

0.90
6

0.82
-0.33
-0.40

0.96
0.34

0.90

The square root values of the AVEs are highlighted on the diagonal.

To minimize common method variance (CMV), as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003), we used
semantic differential scales in the instrument to increase the proximal and methodological separation
and to reduce “acquiescence bias” caused by respondents’ possible tendency to provide socially
desirable answers and/or to agree with the researcher (Chin et al., 2008).
Furthermore, we collected data in multiple stages of the experiment (before, during, and after the
experiment), hence creating time intervals between the collection the perceptual data. After data
collection, we conducted the exploratory factor analysis. As Appendix B reports, no single factor
emerged as a dominant factor, and multiple factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than one. We
then conducted Harman’s single-factor test (Podsakoff et al., 2003) to further test for the presence of
CMV. We found that the single factor accounted for 17.0 percent, 18.8 percent, and 17.7 percent of
the variances of the online-pharmacies sample, online-banks sample, and pooled sample,
respectively, which were desirably below the 20 percent threshold used in the literature (Igbaria,
Zinatelli, Cragg, & Cavaye, 1997; Song & Zahedi, 2005). However, to further minimize any potential
threat of common method variance, we used the data of a marker variable (specifically collected for
this purpose) to purify our data; thus, the CMV was factored out (Bagozzi, 2011; Podsakoff et al.,
2003; Song & Zahedi, 2005). We purified our data by regressing each item on the marker variable
and using the regression residuals for data analysis. This process factors out common method bias
from the data (Podsakoff et al. 2003). We used the purified data in the analysis.

5.3. Measurement Model
The measurement model was estimated by using the mean-adjusted maximum likelihood (MLM)
method in MPlus, which adjusts for non-normality in data. Per Table 7, all fit indices of the
measurement model were better than recommended thresholds, indicating a good fit for the
measurement model.
Table 7. Measurement Model and DTI Model Fit Indexes
Fit index

Measurement model

DTI model

Threshold*

Normed χ2

1.41

1.85

<3.0

CFI (comparative fit index)

0.991

0.960

>0.90

TLI (Tucker-Lewis index)

0.990

0.957

>0.90

RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation

0.031

0.044

<0.06

SRMR (standardized root mean square residual)

0.029

0.086

<0.10

*

Based on Bentler (1992), Bentler & Bonnett (1980), Browne & Cudeck (1993), Hu & Bentler (1999)
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Confirmatory factor analysis (see Appendix C) shows that the standardized factor loadings of all
factors were greater than 0.70, which is satisfactory (Bagozzi, 2011). Moreover, all t-values for the
factor loadings were well above the 2.54 cut-off value (Muthén & Muthén, 2003). The high and
statistically significant R2 values, ranging from 0.54 to 0.94 for the pharmacies sample and 0.53 to
0.95 for the banks sample, indicated that the items were appropriate for measuring the corresponding
constructs (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000).

5.4. Model Estimation
We used the group analysis approach with MLM algorithm in MPlus to estimate the DTI model with
two groups: online pharmacies and online banks. Per Table 7, all the fit indices of the DTI model were
better than the recommended thresholds, indicating good model fit and supporting our theoretical
model in both online pharmacies and online banks domains. Figure 2 reports the path coefficients, pvalues for one-tailed t-statistic tests, and R2 values of the estimation for the DTI model for both the
online-pharmacies domain (the top values in Figure 2) and the online-banks domain (the bottom
values in Figure 2). Significant control variables are reported in Figure 4.
Coping Appraisal
H1
.59***
.51***

Detector
accuracy
H2
.10*
.27***

R2=.43***
.41***

H3
.13***
.23***

Detector
speed

Detector
response
efficacy

H4
.18*
ns

Coping selfefficacy
R2=.09***
.13***

Threat Appraisal

Cost of
error

H5
.11**
.21***

H6
.10**
ns

Threat
severity
R2=.03 †
.10***

Threat
susceptibility

H7
.52***
.48***
H8
.09**
ns

H9
ns
.09*

Reliance
on the
detector
R2=.30***
.24***
H11
.42***
.36***

Actual
performance
R2=.19***
.15***

H10

***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05, † p<0.1,
ns=not significant,
 Dashed line indicates ns in both domains
Top values: pharmacies domain,
bottom values: banks domain

R2=.21***
.27***

Figure 3. Results of the DTI Model Estimation
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Security
habit
.19***
.24***

Coping self
efficacy

Age
.13***
.10**

.13**
.21***

Threat
severity
Threat
susceptibility

.20***
.11**

Threat
awareness

Threat type
Spoofed=1
Concocted=0

.30***
.45***

Past
Encounters

ns
- .09*

Actual
performance
Top values: pharmacies domain,
bottom values: banks domain
***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05, ns=not significant

.12***
.14***

Gender

Figure 4. Results for Control Variables in the DTI Model
The R2 values of all endogenous variables in the model were statistically significant, which
demonstrates that the model has reasonable explanatory power.

5.4.1. Hypothesized Paths
Of the 11 hypothesized paths in the DTI model, 10 were statistically significant at least in one of the
two domains (Figure 2). H1 and H2 were related to the influence of detector accuracy on detector
response efficacy and coping self-efficacy. The results supported H1 and H2 in the two domains,
indicating the importance of detector accuracy in coping appraisal. The impact of detector speed on
the perception about detector response efficacy and coping self-efficacy were hypothesized in H3 and
H4, respectively. The results provided full support for H3 in both domains and for H4 in the
pharmacies domain.
The high and significant R2 values for detector response efficacy for both domains (0.43 and 0.41,
p<0.001) attest to the explanatory power of tool performance in forming users’ perceptions regarding
detector response efficacy. R2 values for coping self-efficacy were also significant in both domains
(0.09 and 0.13, p<0.001), but at a lower level, indicating the existence of other factors in forming
users’ coping self-efficacy.
The influence of cost of detector error on threat severity and threat susceptibility was hypothesized in
H5 and H6, respectively. Comparing the path coefficients in the two domains for H5 shows that cost
of error had significant impact on perceived threat severity in both domains. Its influence was twice as
large in the banks domain as in the pharmacies domain. For H6, cost of error had significant impact
on threat susceptibility in the pharmacies domain but not in the banks domain, indicating that cost of
error in the banks domain had its greatest impact on threat severity. This makes sense since cost of
error in online banks has more immediate financial implications. Hence, detection error is perceived
to cause more severe financial consequences.
Hypotheses H7-H8 posited that coping appraisal constructs (detector response efficacy and coping selfefficacy) impact the reported reliance on the detector. The results showed that detector response efficacy
(H7) was the primary motivator for reliance on the detector in both domains with almost equally high path
coefficients. This is in line with findings of Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, and Rogers (2000) that coping variables
are stronger behavior motivators than threat variables, and the report by Milne et al. (2000) that “threat
appraisal is a poor predictor of intention and behaviors” (p. 134). Coping self-efficacy (H8) was significant
for only online banks. The result showed that the secondary motivator of detector use depends on domain.
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In online pharmacies where the threat is less severe in terms of direct financial loss, coping self-efficacy
acts as the secondary motivator of reliance on the detector, whereas in online banks with immediate
financial consequences, threat severity is a stronger motivator of reliance on the detector.
H9 and H10 posited that threat appraisal constructs (threat severity and threat susceptibility) are the
antecedents of the reported reliance on the detector. The path for H10 was not significant in either
domain, which indicated threat susceptibility had little role in reliance on the detector. However, threat
severity was significant in the banks domain, indicating that when the threat involves direct financial
consequences, threat severity motivates individuals to heed the detector’s advice when visiting
financial websites. The statistically significant R2 values of reliance on the detector in both domains
(0.30 and 0.24, p<0.001) indicate that the extent of reliance of the detector could be significantly
explained by its hypothesized antecedents in the model.
H11 posited that reliance on the detector improves users’ actual performance in terms of selfprotection against-fake website attacks by avoiding visiting and transacting with fake websites. This
hypothesis was strongly supported with high path coefficient values for both domains. Considering
the fact that performance was objectively measured, the statistically significant R2 values of 0.19 and
0.15 for the two domains show that the improvement in individuals’ security protection is noteworthy.

5.4.2. Control Variables
For the sake of clarity, we report the significant impacts of control variables in Figure 4. The contextsensitivity in terms of threat type was used as a control since we argued that it influences users’ selfprotection performance. The results showed that threat type had significant impact on user
performance in the online banks domain, but not in the online pharmacies domain. This is a novel
finding, indicating that in certain domains with direct financial consequences, the threat of spoofed
fake websites could reduce users’ efforts in self-protection more than that of concocted websites. We
also found that users’ self-protection performance improved with age since age had equally
significant path coefficients in both domains. It seems that the combination of spoofed threat type and
younger age (with less experience or focus) could significantly increase users’ vulnerabilities.
The impacts of security habit on coping self-efficacy and threat severity were significant in both
domains. The differential influence of security habit was stark in the case of threat severity, where the
path coefficient value was 60 percent higher in the banks domain, indicating the importance of
security habit in the perception of threat severity.
Several control variables had significant impacts on threat susceptibility. Threat awareness, past
encounters with fake-websites, and gender had significant influence on threat susceptibility in both
domains. The high significance of threat awareness and past encounters with fake websites show
that personal knowledge and experience played a major role in the perception of susceptibility to
security threat. Furthermore, women felt more susceptible to threats than men in both domains with
almost identical path coefficients. This finding is in line with other IT-related studies indicating gender
differences in dealing with IT and risky conditions (e.g., Leonard & Cronan, 2001, Venkatesh et al.
2003). Education was not significant as a control variable. Together, these results indicate that users’
profiles have significant influence on their perceptions of security-related constructs, which, in turn,
impact their reliance on detection tools and their threat-prevention performance.

5.4.3. Context-Sensitivity with Respect to Domain Type
H12 posited that domain moderates the paths in the DTI model. We conducted the pairwise t-test of
path coefficients, using pooled standard errors to test for context-sensitivity (Table 8).
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Table 8. Pairwise T-Test of Domain Differences
Antecedent and consequent paths

Path coefficient
Pharmacy
Bank

Pairwise
t-test

Detector response efficacy
H1: Detector accuracyResponse efficacy
H3: Detector speedResponse efficacy
H7: Response efficacy Reliance on the detector
Coping self-efficacy

0.59***
0.13***
0.52***

0.51***
0.23***
0.48***

ns
†
ns

H2: Detector accuracy Coping self-efficacy
H4: Detector speedCoping self-efficacy

0.10*
0.18*

0.27***
ns

**
** & st

H8: Self-efficacyReliance on the detector
Threat severity

0.09**

ns

* & st

H5: Cost of errorSeverity
H9: SeverityReliance on the detector
Threat susceptibility

0.11**
ns

0.21***
0.09*

†
* & st

H6: Cost of errorSusceptibility

0.10**

ns

* & st

ns

ns

ns

0.42***

0.36***

ns

H10: SusceptibilityReliance on the detector
Reliance on the detector
H11: Reliance on the detectorActual performance

***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05, †p<0.1, ns = not significant, st = structurally different (one path is significant and the other is
insignificant).

The results showed that domain did not play a significant moderating role in the paths from detector
performance (accuracy and speed) to reliance on the detector, except for a directional influence of
speed on response efficacy. In other words, the paths (detector performanceresponse
efficacyuser reliance) were statistically and strongly significant in both domains and were not
sensitive to the two domain types. However, paths from detector performance to user reliance (H2,
H4, and H8) were significantly sensitive to the type of domain. This indicates that context-sensitivity of
domain type exerts its moderating influence on the paths from detector performance to users’ reliance
on the detector via coping self-efficacy.
The results also indicated the presence of context-sensitivity in paths from cost of detector error to
user reliance via threat perceptions (severity and susceptibility). The paths cost of error  severity 
user reliance exhibited statistically significant context-sensitivity, although the path cost of error 
severity was marginally significant. The path cost of error  susceptibility also showed significant
context-sensitivity. Finally, the path from user reliance on users’ actual performance in self-protection
did not exhibit significant context-sensitivity.

6. Discussion
In this study we examined the influence of benefit and cost of detection tools in promoting users’
reliance on such tools and their actual self-protection performance; and whether context-sensitivity
has any role in this process. We relied on the core constructs of the protection motivation theory
(PMT) and contextualized it to develop the DTI theory, thus extending PMT through the introduction
of “context-specificity” and “context-sensitivity.”
We identified the candidate salient tool elements based on theory and empirical research in the
literature and conceptualized the model using the DTI theory. Based on an elaborate and extensive
experimental design, we explored how manipulated perceptions of users with respect to performancerelated elements of detection tools, cost of detection error and contextual factors impact users’ threat
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appraisal and coping appraisal. We also investigated the consequent impacts of such perceptions on
the extent of reliance on detection tools and users’ actual performance in self-protection.
First, detector performance, in terms of accuracy and speed, showed a profound influence on user
reliance on the detector via the coping appraisal constructs. Moreover, detector response efficacy as
a coping mechanism emerged as the single pivotal factor linking detection tools’ performance to
users’ reliance on such tools and subsequently to users’ actual performance in self-protection. The
sheer dominance of response efficacy is a novel finding for creating and promoting fake-website
detection tools. People generally are not good at detecting deceptions (Biros et al., 2002; DePaulo et
al., 1985). Hence, a great deal of effort is allocated to increasing accuracy and reducing the run time
of such tools (Abbasi & Chen, 2009a). Our results shed light on the importance of such research and
indicate that detection tools should be developed, assessed, and marketed based on these
performance criteria. Furthermore, we found that path coefficients linking performance elements and
reliance via response efficacy are not context sensitive. This lack of context-sensitivity points to the
broadly generalizable importance of the role of perceptions about tools’ response efficacy in
promoting users’ reliance and self-protection performance.
Second, most IS studies treat self-efficacy as an exogenous variable and do not examine forces
contributing to its change. Our work showed that detector’s performance increases users’ coping selfefficacy. This is a novel finding since it indicates that users make a connection between the “ability” of
an IT artifact and their own ability. The detector accuracy and to some degree its speed enhance
users’ perception about their own ability to fight against online security threats. Prior research has
shown that users feel better about themselves and their capabilities when using more powerful
decision making aids (Hung, 2003). In the context of security behavior research, this finding shows
that the detector has the potential to merge with users’ ego and to become part of their selfperception—“I have more ability since I have a more powerful tool” (in terms of its accuracy and
speed in detecting and preventing the threat).
Third, another major finding in this research is the strong and significant context-sensitivity in the
paths from detector performance to users’ reliance on the detector via coping self-efficacy. This
finding indicates that detectors’ accuracy has a strong impact on users’ coping self-efficacy in the
online banking domain. Thus, users’ self-empowerment requires developing and marketing tools that
boast a high accuracy rate in financially sensitive domains. However, coping self-efficacy does not
promote reliance in such domains. Our result suggests that when it comes to financially sensitive
domains, such as online banks, it is response efficacy of the detector that prompts users to rely on
them. Their own coping self-efficacy counts little in this process. This could be the consequence of
familiarity with the domain. Subjects in the online bank domain were twice as familiar with the domain
as those in the online-pharmacies domain (with t-test significance of p<0.001). It is possible that the
influence of self-efficacy on reliance on the detector is not only moderated by the domain but also by
the extent of familiarity with the domain. This is a line of research that needs further investigation.
Together, these findings regarding self-efficacy point to the potential for a new theoretical framework
in perceiving protective IT artifacts as the extension of self in dealing with online threats. As such,
designers of protective IT artifacts must pay closer attention to the psychology of users for whom the
tools are being designed and domains in which they are used, thus highlighting the need for
protective IT artifacts that have intelligence and can be personalized.
Fourth, another major finding in this work is the strong and significant role of user reliance on the
detector in objectively assessed user performance in self-protection against fake-website threats.
While implied anecdotally in prior studies (Wu et al., 2006; Dhamija et al., 2006), we believe our result
is the first to establish that users’ reliance on the detector has significant impact with high path
coefficient values on users’ performance in multiple contexts. The fact that the path coefficients were
almost equally high in both online-pharmacy and online-bank domains shows that, by relying on the
detector, users significantly improve their success in avoiding fake-website threats regardless of the
domain type.
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Fifth, the impact of cost of detector error on users’ threat appraisal was context sensitive. Cost of
detector error had much larger impact on the perception of threat severity, which, in turn, significantly
influenced reported reliance in the online-banks domain, whereas it had no significant impact in the
online-pharmacies domain. Losses attributable to fake online banks were perceived as more
consequential than losses attributable to purchasing drugs from fake online pharmacies, possibly due
to the fact that our sample was comprised of younger subjects.
However, cost of detector error had little influence on users’ perception of threat susceptibility. We
observed its significant impact on threat susceptibility only in the online-pharmacies domain.
Furthermore, threat susceptibility as a mediator of cost of detector error on user reliance had no
support in either of the two domains.
Sixth, we examined context-sensitivity with respect to threat type. We argued that, due to the lack of
users’ awareness of threat type, it influences only their self-protection performance. Hence, we
examined its role as a control variable. The results supported this argument, indicating that users’
performance deteriorates when the threat goes from concocted to spoofed fake website. This makes
sense since spoofed fake websites imitate familiar and well-known websites, which makes it harder
for users to detect the deception. We also found that age has a positive influence on user
performance. It seems that there is a need to educate younger users regarding the threat of fakewebsite attacks, particularly about spoofed attacks.
Seventh, the significant roles of security habit, threat awareness, and past encounters with fake
websites indicate that users’ knowledge, experience and habit are salient in their security behaviors
and performance. Moreover, the significance of gender shows that women feel more susceptible.
Together, these results indicate the need to take into account the users’ personal profiles in
developing protective tools and the need for an intelligent approach to the design of detection tools.

7. Implications, Limitations, and Future Directions
7.1. Theoretical Implications
This paper makes a number of novel contributions to theory. Following the theory development
arguments by Hong et al. (2014), Johns (2006), Whetten et al. (2009), and Whetten (2009), we
borrowed and extended the protection motivation theory (PMT) by contextualizing it—introducing
“context specificity” and investigating its “context sensitivity.” This led to the detection tool impact
(DTI) theory. The DTI theory’s “context specificity” involved core antecedent variables (in terms of
detector benefit and cost) and outcome variables (in terms of users’ reliance on the detector and
users’ actual self-protection performance). We examined the theory’s context-sensitivity by
investigating the role of domain type and threat type. The contextualized DTI theory is a novel
theoretical contribution of this work, which opens a new avenue for its extension and elaboration to
other types of security tool.
Second, this study found that accuracy and speed of the detector and perceived detector response
efficacy are the most important factors in users’ utilization of detection tools to counter online
deceptions. Our work shows that the intellectual investment in improving accuracy and speed is
indeed a worthwhile endeavor that should be used in publicizing the performance of detection tools.
Third, our work is the first to show the strong link between the reported reliance on detection tools
and users’ actual performance in avoiding fake-website attacks. It shows the critical paths of detector
performancedetector response efficacyreliance on the detectoruser self-protection
performance in two domains. Although the paths look intuitive, there is little evidence in the literature
in conceptualizing and scientifically testing their significance. Such evidence is needed in order to
convince internet users that the extra effort involved in using detection tools actually pays off in
protecting them against fake-website attacks.
Fourth, our findings uncovered the ways to enhance users’ coping self-efficacy through suitable
development of detection tools. Our findings show that users may view protective IT artifacts as an
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extension of their selves, thus reinforcing the need to combine the design science approach with
behavioral theories to fit protective IT artifacts to individuals’ psychology in order to promote their use.
Reinforcing this ego-boosting perspective of protective tools is the role of self-efficacy, which can be
enhanced through performance elements of tools, leading to users’ reliance on the detector as moderated
by domain type. This is a novel finding that opens a new avenue of research into self-efficacy’s role in
dealing with security threats and the design of intelligent tools with personalization capabilities.
Finally, this study contributes to design science research by proposing and empirically testing the DTI
model by which design science scholars can test and evaluate various salient elements of protective
IT artifacts. Given the differences in the theoretical foundation for adoption behaviors and for
avoidance behaviors (Liang & Xue, 2009), the DTI model may be a more suitable and specialized
alternative to the technology acceptance model as an evaluation model for protective IT artifacts.

7.2. Practical Implications
This study provides a framework for the empirical design and evaluation of protective IT artifacts. By
manipulating performance and context elements under this framework, designers can test and evaluate
the usability and effectiveness of various design prototypes of a protective IT artifact. The implications for
practice are far-reaching. First, based on the findings of this study, to increase adoption of a protective IT
artifact, designers need to focus on users’ coping appraisal process. Second, perceived response efficacy
could be used as a metric for evaluating designs of protective tools, assessing their performance, and
promoting their use. This provides a clear and consistent strategy for security software and Web browser
development companies that produce such tools. Although satisfaction has emerged as a perceptual
construct to gauge customers’ behaviors, users’ perceived response efficacy as a metric of users’
behavior and perception has not received adequate recognition. Our results underline the importance of
this metric for measuring users’ perceptions and behaviors.
Third, the findings show that tool developers should strive for maximum accuracy and speed in
application domains. Fake-website detection tool developers routinely balance two competing
considerations: accuracy versus runtime. Research has shown that tools that incorporate a larger,
more sophisticated set of signatures (i.e., “fraud cues”) are capable of detecting fake websites with
greater accuracy but at the expense of longer runtimes; in some cases, several seconds longer per
detection (Abbasi & Chen, 2009b). Interestingly, in our study, users showed a clear preference for
“having the cake and eating it too,” with more accurate, faster detection garnering the highest
response efficacy.
Fourth, software companies that produce detectors should pay special attention to the potential
market for intelligent tools that can be personalized based on the domain of websites as well as on
users’ traffic patterns and profiles. Personalization could increase the efficacy of detectors and
people’s interest in using them. Personalized intelligent detectors could be either free standing tools
or integrated with intelligent assistants on which users rely for various personal tasks.
Finally, our findings suggest that increasing reliance on detection tools might be accomplished
through positively promoting individuals’ coping appraisal. Protective tools are normally promoted by
highlighting risk, susceptibility and negative consequences of exposure to threats. Our work shows
that organizations and companies with the mandate of promoting security tools may also find value in
leveraging positive campaigns that increase public awareness of the accuracies and runtime speeds
associated with protective tools. The collective reliance on such tools could reduce the success of
fake websites and increase online security.

7.3. Limitations and Future Research
This study has limitations. We collected our data for two sensitive domains—online pharmacies and
online banks. Therefore, our results should be interpreted within these domains. In addition, our
participants interacted with detection tool stimuli that were not embedded in an Internet browser or
running as a real-time system. This could be considered a limitation. However, our stimuli closely
imitated main features of existing detection tools while eliminating brand name bias. Thus,
participants had a unified experiment platform and, consequently, variances due to participants’
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varying experiences and knowledge of specific tools were removed. Further, this study was
conducted within an academic environment, mostly with younger undergraduate and graduate
students. Although such a population represents a large proportion of Internet users, care must be
taken in generalizing our findings to other populations such of those in other countries and older
adults. However, it is important to note that fake websites are a pertinent problem for the population
segment utilized in this study. The two most commonly targeted groups for fake-website attacks are
students and the elderly (Ramzan & Wuest, 2007). In the context of online banking, younger people
(between 18 and 34) are major users of online banking and are also susceptible to online bankingrelated security threats (McAfee, 2011a). In the context of online pharmacies, 25 percent to 30
percent of people under the age of 35 take at least one prescription drug, and well over 40 percent
take over-the-counter medication (Maris, 2012; Center for Disease Control, 2010). Moreover, younger
people and students are just as likely to use online pharmacies as other segments of the population
(Orizio, Merla, Schulz, & Gelatti, 2011). Therefore, we believe that using a student population to study
fake-website detection security behavior in the online banking and online pharmacy domains is
warranted. However, future research should also be conducted on older and non-student populations.
For instance, as alluded to earlier, it would be interesting to see how these other populations perceive
losses in different domains such as online banking and online pharmacies.
This paper has proposed a number of research avenues for building theories that combine the
strength of design science and behavioral science in creating compelling personalized protective IT
artifacts. Another direction of future research is the use of the DTI theory and model in examining the
salient elements for other protective IT artifacts. In situations where a tool may provide detection
capabilities for several threats with varying levels of accuracy and speed, it remains unclear how
response efficacy for individual tool components (as well as the tool as a whole) would be impacted.
Further research investigating salient elements for such enterprise-level security tools with several
protective capabilities including fake-website detection, anti-virus, malware protection, intrusion
detection, and so on, is warranted. Finally, other Internet usage domains—particularly hedonic
domains such as online games and social networking—could be explored in future research. It is
possible that the impacts of the detector’s salient elements in hedonic domains will be different from
those in utilitarian domains such as the online pharmacies and online banks employed in this study.
This paper is part of a larger, federally funded project that involves investigating fake-website
detection tools in terms of performance-related elements, user-interface elements, multiple domains,
and personalization through intelligent user interface.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Instrument
Table A-1. Instrument
Constructs

Code

Items
In evaluating the detection performance of the DS (Detection System) to assist me to
successfully avoid fake websites, I believe that, the DS was

Detector response
efficacy

res1*

not helpful at all/very helpful for sure

res2

not valuable at all/very valuable for sure

res3

not useful at all/very useful for sure
When it comes to the cost of following a wrong recommendation made by the DS, I believe
that,

Cost of detector error

cost1

the extent of my loss was (very low/very high )

cost2

The amount of money I lost was (very low/very high)

cost3

In general, the consequence of errors made by the DS was (not severe at all/very severe for
sure)
When it comes to my ability to take protective actions against fake websites, I believe that

Coping self-efficacy

self1

my knowledge for taking protective actions is (not adequate at all / very adequate for sure)

self2

my ability to take protective actions is (very low/very high)

self3

for me, taking protective actions is (very difficult/very easy)
When it comes to the severity of damage due to using fake websites , I believe that

Threat Severity

sev1

the extent of my potential damages due to using fake websites is (very low/very high)

sev2

my possible loss due to using fake websites is (very low/very high)

sev3

for me, the extent of the negative consequences of using fake websites (very low/very high)
When it comes to the likelihood of encountering fake websites, I believe that

Threat Susceptibility

Reported reliance on
the detector

sus1

the chance of my encountering fake websites is (very low/very high)

sus2

the likelihood that I would encounter fake websites is (very low/very high)

sus3

the possibility of my encountering fake websites is (very low/very high)

rel1

During the experiment, the extent to which I followed the advice of the DS was (very low/very
high)

rel2

In making my decisions during the experiment, the extent of my reliance on the DS advice
was (very low/very high)

rel3

In informing my opinions about the website in the experiment, the extent of my reliance on
the DS advice was (very low/very high)
When it comes to my awareness of fake websites, I

Threat awareness

awe1

don't know anything about them/ know a lot about them

awe2

haven't heard about them at all/ have heard a lot about them for sure

awe3

am not familiar with them at all/ am very familiar with them for sure
When using the web, for me, taking security precautions is

Security habit

Past encounters with
fake websites

481

hab1

not in my nature at all/in my nature for sure

hab2

not routine at all/very routine for sure

hab3

not habitual at all/very habitual for sure

past1

When it comes to my past encounters with fake websites, the number of my encounters has
been (very low/very high)

past2

the number of fake websites I visited has been (very low/very high)

past3

the frequency of my encounters with fake websites has been (very low/very high)

Perceived detector
accuracy

Acc

Perceived detector
speed

speed

I believe this accuracy it was: not acceptable at all/was acceptable for sure
I believe that this detection time was: not acceptable at all/was acceptable for sure
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Appendix B: Exploratory Factor Analysis
Table B-1. Exploratory Factor Analysis for the DTI Model
Pharmacies
Constructs

Items

Banks

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

cost1

-.02

-.04

.07

-.13

.09

.88

-.03

.00

-.01

.18

-.14

.86

cost2

-.05

-.04

.09

-.18

.03

.88

-.14

-.10

-.02

.06

-.23

.86

cost3

-.19

.05

.01

-.05

.00

.87

-.23

.06

.01

.07

-.11

.84

res1

.91

.29

.00

.10

-.02

-.12

.90

.27

.01

.06

.15

-.15

res2

.93

.25

.01

.10

-.02

-.09

.92

.23

.00

.08

.15

-.13

res3

.93

.23

-.01

.12

.00

-.08

.92

.23

.01

.06

.15

-.15

self1

.13

.07

-.04

.91

.00

-.14

.13

.05

.04

.01

.89

-.22

self2

.10

.08

.03

.93

.03

-.12

.18

.03

.02

.02

.93

-.16

self3

.07

.12

.01

.91

-.03

-.10

.09

.08

-.01

.00

.92

-.10

sus1

.01

.02

.93

-.02

.13

.05

.00

.03

.93

.11

.03

-.03

sus2

.00

.02

.95

-.03

.13

.06

-.02

.01

.96

.05

.00

-.01

sus3

.00

.01

.93

.05

.13

.06

.04

.01

.93

.08

.01

.02

sev1

.00

-.01

.12

.01

.93

.03

.08

.03

.08

.93

.02

.09

sev2

-.02

.01

.14

.01

.94

.04

.07

.06

.08

.94

.01

.13

sev3

-.01

.05

.12

-.01

.90

.06

.02

.10

.09

.91

.00

.08

rel1

.19

.89

-.03

.13

.05

-.03

.19

.90

.01

.05

.08

-.04

rel2

.27

.92

.02

.07

.01

.03

.21

.94

.02

.06

.06

.02

rel3

.28

.91

.07

.09

.00

-.02

.25

.91

.02

.09

.02

-.01

Eigenvalue

4.8

3.5

2.5

1.9

1.8

1.3

5.0

3.4

2.7

2.1

1.5

1.2

Cumulative variance
explained (%)

15.7

30.6

45.5

60.1

74.7

87.9

15.5

30.7

45.6

60.4

75.2 88.4

Cost of
detector error

Response
efficacy

Coping selfefficacy

Threat
susceptibility

Threat severity

Reported
reliance on the
detector
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Appendix C: Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Table C-1. Results of Confirmatory Factory Analysis (Purified Data)
Constructs

Cost of detector error

Detector response efficacy

Coping self-efficacy

Threat susceptibility

Threat severity

Reliance on the detector

Threat awareness

Security habit

Past encounters with fake
websites

483

Items

Pharmacies

Banks

Loading

t-value

R2

Loading

t-value

R2

cost1

0.81

40.55

0.66

0.81

39.11

0.65

cost2

0.88

40.29

0.77

0.88

50.07

0.77

cost3

0.80

34.10

0.63

0.79

32.58

0.62

res1

0.94

108.94

0.89

0.95

101.70

0.90

res2

0.97

178.83

0.94

0.96

88.58

0.92

res3

0.96

141.68

0.91

0.96

119.70

0.92

self1

0.89

53.87

0.78

0.89

54.97

0.79

self2

0.95

64.93

0.89

0.96

70.98

0.92

self3

0.87

48.61

0.75

0.86

55.07

0.74

sus1

0.89

56.40

0.80

0.90

58.16

0.81

sus2

0.95

89.44

0.91

0.96

95.36

0.92

sus3

0.89

52.46

0.79

0.89

56.93

0.80

sev1

0.90

56.83

0.81

0.91

61.85

0.83

sev2

0.95

67.81

0.91

0.95

68.31

0.90

sev3

0.85

41.52

0.72

0.86

43.48

0.74

rel1

0.84

40.20

0.70

0.85

52.18

0.73

rel2

0.97

126.44

0.93

0.97

140.71

0.95

rel3

0.94

95.59

0.89

0.93

75.34

0.87

awa1

0.88

55.75

0.77

0.87

56.23

0.76

awa2

0.74

27.66

0.54

0.73

32.04

0.53

awa3

0.93

68.61

0.87

0.91

49.22

0.83

hab1

0.88

51.59

0.78

0.90

57.41

0.81

hab2

0.97

124.44

0.94

0.96

81.15

0.92

hab3

0.95

111.30

0.90

0.96

142.88

0.92

past1

0.80

30.13

0.64

0.84

37.74

0.71

past2

0.88

39.04

0.77

0.90

42.65

0.81

past3

0.88

41.52

0.77

0.91

55.93

0.83
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